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Abstract
We tackle the problem of classifying news articles pertaining
to disinformation vs mainstream news by solely inspecting
their diffusion mechanisms on Twitter. Our technique is in-
herently simple compared to existing text-based approaches,
as it allows to by-pass the multiple levels of complexity which
are found in news content (e.g. grammar, syntax, style). We
employ a multi-layer representation of Twitter diffusion net-
works, and we compute for each layer a set of global network
features which quantify different aspects of the sharing pro-
cess. Experimental results with two large-scale datasets, cor-
responding to diffusion cascades of news shared respectively
in the United States and Italy, show that a simple Logistic
Regression model is able to classify disinformation vs main-
stream networks with high accuracy (AUROC up to 94%),
also when considering the political bias of different sources
in the classification task. We also highlight differences in the
sharing patterns of the two news domains which appear to be
country-independent. We believe that our network-based ap-
proach provides useful insights which pave the way to the fu-
ture development of a system to detect misleading and harm-
ful information spreading on social media.
Introduction and related work
In recent years there has been increasing interest on the issue
of disinformation spreading on online social media. Global
concern over false (or ”fake”) news as a threat to modern
democracies has been frequently raised–ever since 2016 US
Presidential elections–in correspondence of events of polit-
ical relevance, where the proliferation of manipulated and
low-credibility content attempts to drive and influence peo-
ple opinions (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017)(Grinberg et al.
2019)(Bovet and Makse 2019)(Lazer et al. 2018).
Researchers have highlighted several drivers for the diffu-
sion of such malicious phenomenon, which include human
factors (confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998), naive realism
(Reed, Turiel, and Brown 2013)), algorithmic biases (filter
bubble effect (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017)), the presence of
deceptive agents on social platforms (bots and trolls (Shao
et al. 2018a)) and, lastly, the formation of echo chambers
(Del Vicario et al. 2016) where people polarize their opin-
ions as they are insulated from contrary perspectives.
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The problem of automatically detecting online disinfor-
mation news has been typically formulated as a binary clas-
sification task (i.e. credible vs non-credible articles), and
tackled with a variety of different techniques, based on tradi-
tional machine learning and/or deep learning, which mainly
differ in the dataset and the features they employ to perform
the classification. We may distinguish three approaches:
those built on content-based features, those based on fea-
tures extracted from the social context, and those which
combine both aspects. A few main challenges hinder the
task, namely the impossibility to manually verify all news
items, the lack of gold-standard datasets and the adversar-
ial setting in which malicious content is created (Lazer et al.
2018)(Shao et al. 2018a).
In this work we follow the direction pointed out in a
few recent contributions on the diffusion of disinformation
compared to traditional and objective information. These
have shown that false news spread faster and deeper than
true news (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018), and that social
bots and echo chambers play an important role in the dif-
fusion of malicious content (Shao et al. 2018a; Del Vicario
et al. 2016). Therefore we focus on the analysis of spread-
ing patterns which naturally arise on social platforms as a
consequence of multiple interactions between users, due to
the increasing trend in online sharing of news (Allcott and
Gentzkow 2017).
A deep learning framework for detection of fake news
cascades is provided in (Monti et al. 2019), where the au-
thors refer to (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018) in order
to collect Twitter cascades pertaining to verified false and
true rumors. They employ geometric deep learning, a novel
paradigm for graph-based structures, to classify cascades
based on four categories of features, such as user profile,
user activity, network and spreading, and content. They also
observe that a few hours of propagation are sufficient to dis-
tinguish false news from true news with high accuracy. Dif-
fusion cascades on Weibo and Twitter are analyzed in (Zhao
et al. 2018), where authors focus on highlighting different
topological properties, such as the number of hops from the
source or the heterogeneity of the network, to show that fake
news shape diffusion networks which are highly different
from credible news, even at early stages of propagation.
In this work, we consider the results of (Pierri, Piccardi,
and Ceri 2020) as our baseline. The authors use off-the-shelf
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machine learning classifiers to accurately classify news arti-
cles leveraging Twitter diffusion networks. To this aim, they
consider a set of basic features which can be qualitatively in-
terpreted w.r.t to the social behavior of users sharing credible
vs non-credible information. Their methodology is overall
in accordance with (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011), where authors
successfully detect Twitter astroturfing content, i.e. political
campaigns disguised as spontaneous grassroots, with a ma-
chine learning framework based on network features.
In this paper, we propose a classification framework based
on a multi-layer formulation of Twitter diffusion networks.
For each article we disentangle different social interactions
on Twitter, namely tweets, retweets, mentions, replies and
quotes, to accordingly build a diffusion network composed
of multiple layers (on for each type of interaction), and we
compute structural features separately for each layer. We
pick a set of global network properties from the network sci-
ence toolbox which can be qualitatively explained in terms
of social dimensions and allow us to encode different net-
works with a tuple of features. These include traditional in-
dicators, e.g. network density, number of strong/weak con-
nected components and diameter, and more elaborated ones
such as main K-core number (Batagelj and Zaversnik 2003)
and structural virality (Goel et al. 2015). Our main research
question is whether the use of a multi-layer, disentangled
network yields a significant advance in terms of classifi-
cation accuracy over a conventional single-layer diffusion
network. Additionally, we are interested in understanding
which of the above features, and in which layer, are most
effective in the classification task.
We perform classification experiments with an off-the-
shelf Logistic Regression model on two different datasets
of mainstream and disinformation news shared on Twitter
respectively in the United States and in Italy during 2019.
In the former case we also account for political biases in-
herent to different news sources, referring to the procedure
proposed in (Bovet and Makse 2019) to label different out-
lets. Overall we show that we are able to classify credible vs
non-credible diffusion networks (and consequently news ar-
ticles) with high accuracy (AUROC up to 94%), even when
accounting for the political bias of sources (and training only
on left-biased or right-biased articles). We observe that the
layer of mentions alone conveys useful information for the
classification, denoting a different usage of this functionality
when sharing news belonging to the two news domains. We
also show that most discriminative features, which are rela-
tive to the breadth and depth of largest cascades in different
layers, are the same across the two countries.
The outline of this paper is the following: we first formu-
late the problem and describe data collection, network rep-
resentation and structural properties employed for the classi-
fication; then we provide experimental results–classification
performances, layer and feature importance analyses and a
temporal classification evaluation–and finally we draw con-
clusions and future directions.
Methodology
Disinformation and mainstream news
In this work we formulate our classification problem as fol-
lows: given two classes of news articles, respectivelyD (dis-
information) and M (mainstream), a set of news articles Ai
and associated class labelsCi ∈ {D,M}, and a set of tweets
Πi = {T 1i , T 2i , ...} each of which contains an Uniform Re-
source Locator (URL) pointing explicitly to article Ai, pre-
dict the class Ci of each article Ai.
There is huge debate and controversy on a proper taxon-
omy of malicious and deceptive information (Grinberg et al.
2019)(Bovet and Makse 2019)(Davis et al. 2016)(Shao et al.
2016)(Shao et al. 2018b)(Lazer et al. 2018)(Pierri, Piccardi,
and Ceri 2020). In this work we prefer the term disinforma-
tion to the more specific fake news to refer to a variety of
misleading and harmful information. Therefore, we follow a
source-based approach, a consolidated strategy also adopted
by (Shao et al. 2018a)(Shao et al. 2016)(Bovet and Makse
2019)(Grinberg et al. 2019), in order to obtain relevant data
for our analysis. We collected:
1. Disinformation articles, published by websites which are
well-known for producing low-credibility content, false
and misleading news reports as well as extreme propa-
ganda and hoaxes and flagged as such by reputable jour-
nalists and fact-checkers;
2. Mainstream news, referring to traditional news outlets
which deliver factual and credible information.
We believe that this is currently the most reliable classifi-
cation approach, but it entails obvious limitations, as disin-
formation outlets may also publish true stories and likewise
misinformation is sometimes reported on mainstream me-
dia. Also, given the choice of news sources, we cannot test
whether our methodology is able to classify disinformation
vs factual but not mainstream news which are published on
niche, non-disinformation outlets.
US dataset
We collected tweets associated to a dozen US main-
stream news websites, i.e. most trusted sources described in
(Mitchell et al. 2014), with the Streaming API, and we re-
ferred to Hoaxy API (Shao et al. 2016) for what concerns
tweets containing links to 100+ US disinformation outlets.
We filtered out articles associated to less than 50 tweets.
The resulting dataset contains overall ∼1.7 million tweets
for mainstream news, collected in a period of three weeks
(February 25th, 2019-March 18th, 2019), which are associ-
ated to 6,978 news articles, and ∼1.6 million tweets for dis-
information, collected in a period of three months (January
1st, 2019-March 18th, 2019) for sake of balance of the two
classes, which hold 5,775 distinct articles. Diffusion censor-
ing effects (Goel et al. 2015) were correctly taken into ac-
count in both collection procedures. We provide in Figure
1 the distribution of articles by source and political bias for
both news domains.
As it is reported that conservatives and liberals exhibit
different behaviors on online social platforms (Barbera´ et
al. 2015)(Conover et al. 2012)(Bovet, Morone, and Makse
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Count
theguardian.com
washingtonpost.com
nytimes.com
cnn.com
foxnews.com
wsj.com
msnbc.com
newyorker.com
news.yahoo.com
abcnews.go.com
economist.com
politico.com
pbs.org
usatoday.com
W
eb
si
te
Left
Right
Centre
a) US mainstream articles
b) US disinformation articles
Figure 1: Distribution of the number of articles per source
for US a) mainstream and b) disinformation news. Colors
indicate the political bias label of each source.
2018), we further assigned a political bias label to different
US outlets (and therefore news articles) following the proce-
dure described in (Bovet and Makse 2019). In order to assess
the robustness of our method, we performed classification
experiments by training only on left-biased (or right-biased)
outlets of both disinformation and mainstream domains and
testing on the entire set of sources, as well as excluding par-
ticular sources that outweigh the others in terms of samples
to avoid over-fitting.
Italian dataset
For what concerns the Italian scenario we first collected
tweets with the Streaming API in a 3-week period (April
19th, 2019-May 5th, 2019), filtering those containing URLs
pointing to Italian official newspapers websites as described
in (Vicario et al. 2019); these correspond to the list provided
by the association for the verification of newspaper circula-
tion in Italy (Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa)1. We instead
referred to the dataset provided by (Pierri, Artoni, and Ceri
2020) to obtain a set of tweets, collected continuously since
January 2019 using the same Twitter endpoint, which con-
tain URLs to 60+ Italian disinformation websites2. In order
to get balanced classes (April 5th, 2019-May 5th, 2019), we
1http://www.adsnotizie.it
2The list is available at https://bit.ly/30lJKhx
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Figure 2: Distribution of the number of articles per source
for Italian a) mainstream and b) disinformation news.
retained data collected in a longer period w.r.t to mainstream
news. In both cases we filtered out articles with less than
50 tweets; overall this dataset contains ∼160k mainstream
tweets, corresponding to 227 news articles, and ∼100k dis-
information tweets, corresponding to 237 news articles. We
provide in Figure 2 the distribution of articles according to
distinct sources for both news domains. As in the US dataset,
we took into account censoring effects (Goel et al. 2015) by
excluding tweets published before (left-censoring) or after
two weeks (right-censoring) from the beginning of the col-
lection process.
The different volumes of news shared on Twitter in the
two countries are due both to the different population size
of US and Italy (320 vs 60 millions) but also to the different
usage of Twitter platform (and social media in general) for
news consumption (Nielsen et al. 2019). Both datasets ana-
lyzed in this work are available from the authors on request.
A crucial aspect in our approach is the capability to fully
capturing sharing cascades on Twitter associated to news
articles. It has been reported (Morstatter et al. 2013) that
the Twitter streaming endpoint filters out tweets matching
a given query if they exceed 1% of the global daily vol-
ume3 of shared tweets, which nowadays is approximately
5 ·108; however, as we always collected less than 106 tweets
per day, we did not incur in this issue and we thus gathered
3https://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/
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Figure 3: An example of Twitter multi-layer diffusion net-
work with four layers.
100% of tweets matching our query.
Building diffusion networks
We built Twitter diffusion networks following an approach
widely adopted in the literature (Shao et al. 2018a)(Shao et
al. 2018b)(Bovet and Makse 2019). We remark that there is
an unavoidable limitation in Twitter Streaming API, which
does not allow to retrieve true re-tweeting cascades be-
cause re-tweets always point to the original source and not
to intermediate re-tweeting users (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral
2018)(Goel et al. 2015); thus we adopt the only viable ap-
proach based on Twitter’s public availability of data. Be-
sides, by disentangling different interactions with multiple
layers we potentially reduce the impact of this limitation on
the global network properties compared to the single-layer
approach used in our baseline.
Using the notation described in (Kivela¨ et al. 2014). we
employ a multi-layer representation for Twitter diffusion
networks. Sociologists have indeed recognized decades ago
that it is crucial to study social systems by constructing mul-
tiple social networks where different types of ties among
same individuals are used (Wasserman, Faust, and others
1994). Therefore, for each news article we built a multi-
layer diffusion network composed of four different layers,
one for each type of social interaction on Twitter platform,
namely retweet (RT), reply (R), quote (Q) and mention (M),
as shown in Figure 3. These networks are not necessarily
node-aligned, i.e. users might be missing in some layers.
We do not insert ”dummy” nodes to represent all users as
it would have severe impact on the global network proper-
ties (e.g. number of weakly connected components). Alter-
natively one may look at each multi-layer diffusion network
as an ensemble of individual graphs (Kivela¨ et al. 2014);
since global network properties are computed separately for
each layer, they are not affected by the presence of any inter-
layer edges.
In our multi-layer representation, each layer is a directed
graph where we add edges and nodes for each tweet of the
layer type, e.g. for the RT layer: whenever user a retweets
account b we first add nodes a and b if not already present in
the RT layer, then we build an edge that goes from b to a if
it does not exists or we increment the weight by 1. Similarly
for the other layers: for the R layer edges go from user a
(who replies) to user b, for the Q layer edges go from user
b (who is quoted by) to user a and for the M layer edges go
from user a (who mentions) to user b.
Note that, by construction, our layers do not include iso-
lated nodes; they correspond to ”pure tweets”, i.e. tweets
which have not originated any interactions with other users.
However, they are present in our dataset, and their number
is exploited for classification, as described below.
Global network properties
We used a set of global network indicators which allow us to
encode each network layer by a tuple of features. Then we
simply concatenated tuples as to represent each multi-layer
network with a single feature vector. We used the following
global network properties:
1. Number of Strongly Connected Components (SCC): a
Strongly Connected Component of a directed graph is a
maximal (sub)graph where for each pair of vertices u, v
there is a path in each direction (u→ v, v → u).
2. Size of the Largest Strongly Connected Component
(LSCC): the number of nodes in the largest strongly con-
nected component of a given graph.
3. Number of Weakly Connected Components (WCC): a
Weakly Connected Component of a directed graph is a
maximal (sub)graph where for each pair of vertices (u, v)
there is a path u↔ v ignoring edge directions.
4. Size of the Largest Weakly Connected Component
(LWCC): the number of nodes in the largest weakly con-
nected component of a given graph.
5. Diameter of the Largest Weakly Connected Compo-
nent (DWCC): the largest distance (length of the shortest
path) between two nodes in the (undirected version of)
largest weakly connected component of a graph.
6. Average Clustering Coefficient (CC): the average of the
local clustering coefficients of all nodes in a graph; the
local clustering coefficient of a node quantifies how close
its neighbours are to being a complete graph (or a clique).
It is computed according to (Sarama¨ki et al. 2007).
7. Main K-core Number (KC): a K-core (Batagelj and Za-
versnik 2003) of a graph is a maximal sub-graph that con-
tains nodes of internal degree k or more; the main K-core
number is the highest value of k (in directed graphs the
total degree is considered).
8. Density (d): the density for directed graphs is d =
|E|
|V ||V−1| , where |E| is the number of edges and |N | is
the number of vertices in the graph; the density equals 0
for a graph without edges and 1 for a complete graph.
9. Structural virality of the largest weakly connected
component (SV): this measure is defined in (Goel et al.
2015) as the average distance between all pairs of nodes
in a cascade tree or, equivalently, as the average depth of
nodes, averaged over all nodes in turn acting as a root;
for |V | > 1 vertices, SV = 1|V ||V−1|
∑
i
∑
j dij where
dij denotes the length of the shortest path between nodes
i and j. This is equivalent to compute the Wiener’s in-
dex (Wiener 1947) of the graph and multiply it by a factor
1
|V ||V−1| . In our case we computed it for the undirected
equivalent graph of the largest weakly connected compo-
nent, setting it to 0 whenever V = 1.
We used networkx Python package (Hagberg, Swart, and
S Chult 2008) to compute all features. Whenever a layer
is empty. we simply set to 0 all its features. In addition to
computing the above nine features for each layer, we added
two indicators for encoding information about pure tweets,
namely the number T of pure tweets (containing URLs to
a given news article) and the number U of unique users au-
thoring those tweets. Therefore, a single diffusion network
is represented by a vector with 9 · 4 + 2 = 38 entries.
Interpretation of network features and layers
Aforementioned network properties can be qualitatively ex-
plained in terms of social footprints as follows: SCC corre-
lates with the size of the diffusion network, as the propaga-
tion of news occurs in a broadcast manner most of the time,
i.e. re-tweets dominate on other interactions, while LSCC
allows to distinguish cases where such mono-directionality
is somehow broken. WCC equals (approximately) the num-
ber of distinct diffusion cascades pertaining to each news
article, with exceptions corresponding to those cases where
some cascades merge together via Twitter interactions such
as mentions, quotes and replies, and accordingly LWCC and
DWCC equals the size and the depth of the largest cascade.
CC corresponds to the level of connectedness of neighbor-
ing users in a given diffusion network whereas KC identifies
the set of most influential users in a network and describes
the efficiency of information spreading (Shao et al. 2018b).
Finally, d describes the proportions of potential connections
between users which are actually activated and SV indicates
whether a news item has gained popularity with a single and
large broadcast or in a more viral fashion through multiple
generations.
For what concerns different Twitter actions, users primar-
ily interact with each other using retweets and mentions
(Conover et al. 2012).
The former are the main engagement activity and act as a
form of endorsement, allowing users to rebroadcast content
generated by other users (Boyd, Golder, and Lotan 2010).
Besides, when node B retweets node A we have an implicit
confirmation that information from A appeared in B’s Twit-
ter feed (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011). Quotes are simply a special
case of retweets with comments.
Mentions usually include personal conversations as they al-
low someone to address a specific user or to refer to an in-
dividual in the third person; in the first case they are located
at the beginning of a tweet and they are known as replies,
No. Mainstream No. Disinformation
Size Class Left Right Tot. Left Right Tot.
[0, 100) 774 2746 4177 379 2086 2640
[100, 1000) 1712 464 2605 654 1946 2900
[1000,+∞) 115 54 196 19 162 235
[0,+∞) 4573 1292 6978 1052 4194 5575
Table 1: Composition of the US dataset according to class,
size and political bias.
Size Class No. Mainstream No. Disinformation
[0, 100) 165 79
[100, 1000) 61 158
[0,+∞) 227 237
Table 2: Composition of the Italian dataset according to class
and size.
otherwise they are put in the body of a tweet (Conover et
al. 2012). The network of mentions is usually seen as a
stronger version of interactions between Twitter users, com-
pared to the traditional graph of follower/following relation-
ships (Grabowicz et al. 2012).
Experiments
Setup
We performed classification experiments using a basic off-
the-shelf classifier, namely Logistic Regression (LR) with
L2 penalty; this also allows us to compare results with our
baseline. We applied a standardization of the features and we
used the default configuration for parameters as described
in scikit-learn package (Pedregosa et al. 2011). We
also tested other classifiers (such as K-Nearest Neighbors,
Support Vector Machines and Random Forest) but we omit
results as they give comparable performances. We remark
that our goal is to show that a very simple machine learning
framework, with no parameter tuning and optimization, al-
lows for accurate results with our network-based approach.
We used the following evaluation metrics to assess the
performances of different classifiers (TP=true positives,
FP=false positives, FN=false negatives):
1. Precision = TPTP+FP , the ability of a classifier not to label
as positive a negative sample.
2. Recall = TPTP+FN , the ability of a classifier to retrieve all
positive samples.
3. F1-score = 2 Precision·RecallPrecision+Recall , the harmonic average of
Precision and Recall.
4. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic
curve (AUROC); the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve (Fawcett 2006), which plots the TP rate ver-
sus the FP rate, shows the ability of a classifier to discrim-
inate positive samples from negative ones as its threshold
is varied; the AUROC value is in the range [0, 1], with the
random baseline classifier holding AUROC= 0.5 and the
ideal perfect classifier AUROC= 1; thus larger AUROC
values (and steeper ROCs) correspond to better classifiers.
Size Class AUROC Precision Recall F1-score
(US) [0, 100) 0.87 ± 0.01 0.79 ± 0.01 0.77 ± 0.01 0.78 ± 0.01
(US) [100, 1000) 0.93 ± 0.01 0.87 ± 0.01 0.87 ± 0.01 0.87 ± 0.01
(US) [1000,+∞) 0.94 ± 0.02 0.86 ± 0.05 0.86 ± 0.05 0.86 ± 0.05
(US) [0,+∞) 0.88 ± 0.01 0.81 ± 0.01 0.80 ± 0.01 0.80 ± 0.01
(IT) [0, 100) 0.89 ± 0.06 0.81 ± 0.11 0.82 ± 0.11 0.81 ± 0.11
(IT) [100, 1000) 0.86 ± 0.07 0.83 ± 0.08 0.78 ± 0.06 0.80 ± 0.06
(IT) [0,+∞) 0.90 ± 0.02 0.81 ± 0.05 0.81 ± 0.05 0.81 ± 0.05
Table 3: Different evaluation metrics for the LR classifier
(using a multi-layer approach) evaluated on different size
classes of both the US and the Italian dataset.
Size Class Single-layer Multi-layer
(US) [0, 100) 0.74 ± 0.02 0.87 ± 0.01
(US) [100, 1000) 0.85 ± 0.02 0.93 ± 0.01
(US) [1000,+∞) 0.93 ± 0.03 0.94 ± 0.02
(US) [0,+∞) 0.78 ± 0.02 0.88 ± 0.01
(IT) [0, 100) 0.77 ± 0.08 0.89 ± 0.06
(IT) [100, 1000) 0.66 ± 0.14 0.86 ± 0.07
(IT) [0,+∞) 0.74 ± 0.12 0.90 ± 0.02
Table 4: Comparison of performances of our multi-layer ap-
proach vs the baseline (single-layer). We show AUROC val-
ues for the LR classifier evaluated on different size classes
of both US and IT datasets.
In particular we computed so-called macro average–simple
unweighted mean–of these metrics evaluated considering
both labels (disinformation and mainstream). We employed
stratified shuffle split cross validation (with 10 folds) to eval-
uate performances.
Finally, we partitioned networks according to the total
number of unique users involved in the sharing, i.e. the num-
ber of nodes in the aggregated network represented with
a single-layer representation considering together all layers
and also pure tweets. A breakdown of both datasets accord-
ing to size class (and political biases for the US scenario) is
provided in Table 1 and Table 2.
Classification performances
In Table 3 we first provide classification performances on the
US dataset for the LR classifier evaluated on the size class
described in Table 1. We can observe that in all instances our
methodology performs better than a random classifier (50%
AUROC), with AUROC values above 85% in all cases.
For what concerns political biases, as the classes of main-
stream and disinformation networks are not balanced (e.g.,
1,292 mainstream and 4,149 disinformation networks with
right bias) we employ a Balanced Random Forest with de-
fault parameters (as provided in imblearn Python pack-
age (Lemaıˆtre, Nogueira, and Aridas 2017)). In order to test
the robustness of our methodology, we trained only on left-
biased networks or right-biased networks and tested on the
entire set of sources (relative to the US dataset); we provide
a comparison of AUROC values for both biases in Figure
4. We can notice that our multi-layer approach still entails
significant results, thus showing that it can accurately dis-
tinguish mainstream news from disinformation regardless of
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Figure 4: AUROC values for the Balanced Random Forest
classifier trained on left-biased (red) and right-biased (blue)
news articles in the US dataset, and tested on the entire
dataset. Error bars indicate the standard deviation of AU-
ROC values over different folds of the cross validation.
the political bias. We further corroborated this result with
additional classification experiments, that show similar per-
formances, in which we excluded from the training/test set
two specific sources (one at a time and both at the same
time) that outweigh the others in terms of data samples–
respectively ”breitbart.com” for right-biased sources and
”politicususa.com” for left-biased ones.
We performed classification experiments on the Italian
dataset using the LR classifier and different size classes (we
excluded [1000,+∞) which is empty); we show results for
different evaluation metrics in Table 3. We can see that de-
spite the limited number of samples (one order of magnitude
smaller than the US dataset) the performances are overall in
accordance with the US scenario.
As shown in Table 4, we obtain results which are much
better than our baseline in all size classes (see Table 4):
• In the US dataset our multi-layer methodology performs
much better in all size classes except for large networks
([1000,+∞) size class), reaching up to 13% improve-
ment on smaller networks ([0, 100) size class);
• In the IT dataset our multi-layer methodology outper-
forms the baseline in all size classes, with the max-
imum performance gain (20%) on medium networks
([100, 1000) size class); the baseline generally reaches
bad performances compared to the US scenario.
Overall, our performances are comparable with those
achieved by two state-of-the-art deep learning models for
”fake news” detection (Monti et al. 2019)(Zellers et al.
2019).
Layer importance analysis
In order to understand the impact of each layer on the perfor-
mances of classifiers, we performed additional experiments
considering separately each layer (we ignored T and U fea-
tures relative to pure tweets).
In Table 5 we show metrics for each layer and all size
classes, computed with a 10-fold stratified shuffle split cross
Size Class Metric Quotes Retweets Mentions Replies
[0, 100)
AUROC 0.75 ± 0.02 0.63 ± 0.02 0.75 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.02
Precision 0.71 ± 0.02 0.59 ± 0.02 0.70 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.04
Recall 0.66 ± 0.01 0.55 ± 0.01 0.67 ± 0.01 0.54 ± 0.02
F1-score 0.66 ± 0.02 0.53 ± 0.02 0.68 ± 0.02 0.50 ± 0.06
[100, 1000)
AUROC 0.81 ± 0.02 0.63 ± 0.02 0.81 ± 0.02 0.65 ± 0.03
Precision 0.73 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.02 0.75 ± 0.02 0.65 ± 0.02
Recall 0.73 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.02 0.75 ± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.02
F1-score 0.73 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.02 0.75 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.02
[1000,+∞)
AUROC 0.85 ± 0.08 0.62 ± 0.08 0.84 ± 0.04 0.66 ± 0.06
Precision 0.80 ± 0.08 0.61 ± 0.08 0.75 ± 0.06 0.61 ± 0.10
Recall 0.80 ± 0.08 0.60 ± 0.07 0.75 ± 0.06 0.59 ± 0.07
F1-score 0.79 ± 0.08 0.59 ± 0.08 0.75 ± 0.06 0.58 ± 0.09
[0,+∞)
AUROC 0.76 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.01 0.77 ± 0.01 0.59 ± 0.04
Precision 0.70 ± 0.01 0.58 ± 0.01 0.73 ± 0.01 0.59 ± 0.05
Recall 0.69 ± 0.01 0.56 ± 0.01 0.71 ± 0.01 0.55 ± 0.03
F1-score 0.69 ± 0.01 0.53 ± 0.01 0.71 ± 0.01 0.52 ± 0.05
Table 5: Different evaluations metrics for LR classifier eval-
uated on different size classes of the US dataset and trained
using features separately for each layer. Best scores for each
row are written in bold.
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Figure 5: AUROC values for the LR classifier (evaluated on
different size classes of the US dataset) trained using dif-
ferent layers separately and aggregated (our multi-layer ap-
proach). Error bars indicate the standard deviation of AU-
ROC values over different folds of the cross validation.
validation, evaluated on the US dataset; in Figure 5 we
show AUROC values for each layer compared with the gen-
eral multi-layer approach. We can notice that both Q and
M layers alone capture adequately the discrepancies of the
two distinct news domains in the United States as they ob-
tain good results with AUROC values in the range 75%-
86%; these are comparable with those of the multi-layer ap-
proach which, nevertheless, outperforms them across all size
classes.
We obtained similar performances for the Italian dataset,
as the M layer obtains comparable performances w.r.t multi-
layer approach with AUROC values in the range 72%-82%.
We do not show these results for sake of conciseness.
Feature importance analysis
We further investigated the importance of each feature by
performing a χ2 test, with 10-fold stratified shuffle split
cross validation, considering the entire range of network
sizes [0,+∞). We show the Top-5 most discriminative fea-
tures for each country in Table 6.
We can notice the exact same set of features (with dif-
Rank US IT
#1 SCC (Quotes) LWCC (Retweets)
#2 LWCC (Retweets) SCC (Retweets)
#3 SCC (Retweets) SCC (Quotes)
#4 LWCC (Quotes) LWCC (Quotes)
#5 LWCC (Mentions) LWCC (Mentions)
Table 6: Top-5 most discriminative features according to χ2
test evaluated on both US and IT datasets (considering net-
works in the [0,+∞) size class).
ferent relative orderings in the Top-3) in both countries;
these correspond to two global network propertie–LWCC,
which indicates the size of the largest cascade in the layer,
and SCC, which correlates with the size of the network–
associated to the same set of layers (Quotes, Retweets and
Mentions).
We further performed a χ2 test to highlight the most dis-
criminative features in the M layer of both countries, which
performed equally well in the classification task as previ-
ously highlighted; also in this case we focused on the entire
range of network sizes [0,+∞). Interestingly, we discov-
ered exactly the same set of Top-3 features in both countries,
namely LWCC, SCC and DWCC (which indicates the depth
of the largest cascade in the layer).
An inspection of the distributions of all aforementioned
features revealed that disinformation news exhibit on aver-
age larger values than mainstream news4.
We can qualitatively sum up these results as follows:
1. Sharing patterns in the two news domains exhibit discrep-
ancies which might be country-independent and due to the
content that is being shared.
2. Interactions in disinformation sharing cascades tends to
be broader and deeper than in mainstream news, as
widely reported in the literature (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral
2018)(Bovet and Makse 2019)(Del Vicario et al. 2016).
3. Users likely make a different usage of mentions when
sharing news belonging to the two domains, consequently
shaping different sharing patterns.
Temporal analysis
Similar to (Monti et al. 2019), we carried out additional ex-
periments to answer the following question: how long do we
need to observe a news spreading on Twitter in order to ac-
curately classify it as disinformation or mainstream?
With this goal, we built several versions of our original
dataset of multi-layer networks by considering in turn the
following lifetimes5: 1 hour, 6 hours, 12 hours, 1 day, 2 days,
4We also performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test to
assess whether distributions of these features are statistically equiv-
alent across the two news domains; the hypothesis was rejected in
all cases at α = 0.05.
5For each news article we built the corresponding multi-layer
network considering only tweets shared in the 1st hour, the first 6
hours, the first 12 hours, etc.
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Figure 6: AUROC values for LR classifier evaluated on US
(blue) and IT (green) dataset, considering different lifetimes
(or spreading duration) for multi-layer networks. Error bars
indicate standard deviations of 10-fold cross validation.
3 days and 7 days; for each case, we computed the global
network properties of the corresponding network and eval-
uated the LR classifier with 10-fold cross validation, sepa-
rately for each lifetime (and considering always the entire
set of networks). We show corresponding AUROC values
for both US and IT datasets in Figure 6.
We can see that in both countries news diffusion networks
can be accurately classified after just a few hours of spread-
ing, with AUROC values which are larger than 80% after
only 6 hours of diffusion. These results are very promising
and suggest that articles pertaining to the two news domains
exhibit discrepancies in their sharing patterns that can be
timely exploited in order to rapidly detect misleading items
from factual information.
Conclusions
In this work we tackled the problem of the automatic classi-
fication of news articles in two domains, namely mainstream
and disinformation news, with a language-independent ap-
proach which is based solely on the diffusion of news items
on Twitter social platform. We disentangled different types
of interactions on Twitter to accordingly build a multi-layer
representation of news diffusion networks, and we computed
a set of global network properties–separately for each layer–
in order to encode each network with a tuple of features. Our
goal was to investigate whether a multi-layer representation
performs better than one layer (Pierri, Piccardi, and Ceri
2020), and to understand which of the features, observed at
given layers, are most effective in the classification task.
Experiments with an off-the-shelf classifier such as Logis-
tic Regression on datasets pertaining to two different media
landscapes (US and Italy) yield very accurate classification
results (AUROC up to 94%), even when accounting for the
different political bias of news sources, which are far bet-
ter than our baseline (Pierri, Piccardi, and Ceri 2020) with
improvements up to 20%. Classification performances using
single layers show that the layer of mentions alone entails
better performance w.r.t other layers in both countries.
We also highlighted the most discriminative features
across different layers in both countries; the results suggest
that differences between the two news domains might be
country-independent but rather due only to the typology of
content shared, and that disinformation news shape broader
and deeper cascades.
Additional experiments involving the temporal evolution
of Twitter diffusion networks show that our methodology
can accurate classify mainstream and disinformation news
after a few hours of propagation on the platform.
Overall, our results prove that the topological features
of multi-layer diffusion networks might be effectively ex-
ploited to detect online disinformation. We do not deny
the presence of deceptive efforts to orchestrate the regu-
lar spread of information on social media via content am-
plification and manipulation (Stewart, Arif, and Starbird
2018)(Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman 2018). On the contrary,
we postulate that such hidden forces might play to accentu-
ate the discrepancies between the diffusion patterns of dis-
information and mainstream news (and thus to make our
methodology effective).
In the future we aim to further investigate three directions:
(1) employ temporal networks to represent news diffusion
and apply classification techniques that take into account the
sequential aspect of data (e.g. recurrent neural networks); (2)
carry out an extensive comparison of the diffusion of disin-
formation and mainstream news across countries to inves-
tigate deeper the presence of differences and similarities in
sharing patterns; (3) leverage our network-based features in
addition to state-of-the-art text-based approaches for ”fake
news” dete ction in order to deliver a real-world system to
detect misleading and harmful information spreading on so-
cial media.
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